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Abstract– To date, most facial expression analysis have been 
based on posed image databases and is carried out without 
being able to protect the identity of the subjects whose 
expressions are being recognised. In this paper, we propose 
and implement a system for classifying facial expressions of 
images in the encrypted domain based on a Paillier cryp-
tosystem implementation of Fisher Linear Discriminant 
Analysis and k-nearest neighbour (FLDA + kNN). We 
present results of experiments carried out on a recently 
developed natural visible and infrared facial expression 
(NVIE) database of spontaneous images. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first system that will allow the recog-
nition of encrypted spontaneous facial expressions by a 
remote server on behalf of a client.   
Keywords– Expression classification, spontaneous expres-
sion, encrypted domain, Fisher discriminant analysis. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Facial expressions are the changes in the face stimulated by 
a person’s emotional state and are one of the intuitive ways 
in which humans communicate their emotions. The classifi-
cation of facial expressions allows the identification of such 
emotions, and forms an integral part of affective computing 
which is computing that relates to, arises from, or deliberate-
ly influences emotion or other affective phenomena. As such, 
there is an on-going research interest in the automated 
recognition of these expressions by computer systems within 
the areas of pattern recognition, human-computer interaction, 
human cognition and behavioural science [1]. 
 
Most of the existing research in the area of expression 
recognition and emotion inference is based on posed expres-
sion databases which are stimulated by requesting that 
subjects perform a sequence of emotional expressions in 
front of a camera. These artificial expressions are usually 
exaggerated. On the other hand, spontaneous expressions 
may be subtle and vary in intensity from subject to subject. 
They will also often differ from posed expressions in both 
manner and timing. As such, further to the need to infer 
emotion is the need to do so on a natural database thus 
moving from artificial to natural expression recognition [1], 
effectively leading to more practical applications thereof. 
  
Moreover, there is increasing need to outsource computa-
tional processes while maintaining privacy, which has very  
 
recently prompted research in the area of facial expression 
classification in the encrypted domain. For example, an 
advertiser may wish to identify the expressions of consumers 
in order to estimate their affective responses and reactions to 
advertising campaigns. This could be done using an expres-
sion database on a remote server hosted by a (potentially 
untrustworthy) third-party provider, in which case the 
identities of the consumers will need to be kept private (as it 
is impractical to seek the approval of every consumer who 
views an advertisement). In this example, the third-party 
provider who hosts the expression database and the advertis-
er who wishes to recognise the expression of their consum-
ers can be referred to as the server and client respectively.  
To achieve this, the homomorphic properties of a public-key 
based Paillier cryptosystem will be leveraged in order to 
keep the images of the subjects encrypted throughout the 
exchange between the server and the client [2-4] while 
obtaining the same levels of accuracy as can be obtained on 
plain (non-encrypted) images. 
 
The rest of the paper will be arranged as follows: Section 2 
and 3 will discuss the process of facial expression recogni-
tion using Fisher linear discriminant analysis (FLDA) and k-
nearest neighbour (k-NN) in the plain domain (PD) and in 
the encrypted domain (ED) respectively. In Section 4, we 
will describe the experimental setup and analyse the perfor-
mance of the algorithm in Section 5. The inferred conclu-
sions are presented in Section 6.  
 
2. FISHER LINEAR DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS FOR 
EXPRESSION RECOGNITION 
 
The process of automatic expression classification as im-
plemented in this paper involves two steps the first of which 
is feature extraction using Fisher linear discriminant analysis 
(FLDA) [5]. FLDA is a well-known dimensionality reduc-
tion tool based on principal component analysis (PCA), 
which extracts a set of key features in order to project a 
higher dimensional image onto a lower dimensional space. 
The second step is recognition using a k-nearest neighbour 
(k-NN) approach which is a basic but effective Euclidean 
distance classifier [6] that matches the expression of a 
projected test image against a set of projected training 
images such that the test image is allocated to the same 
expression class as the training image to which it is closest. 
Section 2.1.1 describes this more formally. 
 
 
2.1. FLDA in the Plain Domain 
The matrix representation of a grayscale image (in which 
each element in the matrix represents a corresponding pixel 
value within the image) can be concatenated into a one-
dimensional vector.  
Given  training images to be used to determine the lower 
dimensional feature space when concatenated into vectors of 
dimension – n is given as              , that is              . First, the vectorized training images need to be 
mean centered and this can be achieved by subtracting the 
vector representing the mean of all the training images  ̅ 
from each image vector    , where  ̅  can be evaluated 
as:   ̅    ∑       . The new (lower) dimensional feature 
space vector    corresponding to image vector    is obtained 
by the following linear projection:          ሺ    ̅ሻ      i = 1,…, M 
 
(1) 
where ሺ    ̅ሻ are the mean centered images, and     is 
an optimum projection matrix with orthonormal columns 
(with ሺ ሻ  denoting the transpose). The optimum projection 
matrix is given by [5]: 
                                   (2) 
 
where            denote the feature vectors obtained 
from both       and     . In order to evaluate     , 
consider that the principal component (PC) vectors are the 
eigen vectors of the covariance matrix    (scatter matrix), 
where    is defined as:    ∑ሺ    ̅ሻ    ሺ    ̅ሻ  
 
(3) 
Using eq. (1) and (2), the total covariance matrix of feature 
vectors              is      . The optimal PCA 
projection matrix     is selected to maximise the determi-
nant of the total covariance matrix of projected feature 
vectors, defined as:   
             |     |             
 
(4) 
where           |         is the set of eigenvectors 
relating to the  largest eigenvalues of   . 
 
For (2),      is obtained by maximising the between-class 
scatter while minimizing the within-class scatter which is 
calculated as a function of the matrices SB and SW respec-
tively. Given that: 
    ∑  ሺ    ̅ሻ    ሺ    ̅ሻ         (5) 
and 
    ∑ ∑ ሺ     ሻ      ሺ     ሻ                (6) 
where   is the number of different classes e.g.              representing each expression,    is the mean 
of class    and   is the number of images in that class. As 
such,      can be defined as: 
              |              ||              | (7) 
 
 
2.1.1. Classification in the Plain Domain 
For recognition, given a vectorized test image        , 
the test image needs to be mean centered using the mean of 
the training images  ̅ , subsequently, it is projected onto 
feature space by: 
        ሺ   ̅ሻ  (8) 
 
where  ሺ   ̅ሻ is the mean centered test image and    is the 
corresponding low(er) dimensional feature vector                  where each element can further be 
defined as: 
       ሺ   ̅ሻ, i = 1…m.  (9) 
 
As such, the Euclidean distance   , between   and    for  =1…M can be calculated as: 
    ‖    ‖  ,  =1…M  (10) 
 
the test image projection   is said to belong to the same 
expression class as the projection of training image    for 
the lowest value of   . 
 
3. ENCRYPTED EXPRESSION RECOGNITION 
This section of the paper justifies how the classification of 
facial expressions can be applied to encrypted images. This 
is achieved using the principles employed in [2] in which 
encrypted images of people’s faces were recognised by 
leveraging the homomorphic properties of the Paillier 
cryptosystem [7]. Using the same principles in addition to a 
cryptographic protocol for the comparison of two encrypted 
values, we classify the facial expressions of encrypted 
images in such a way that it can be done by a server hosted 
database without revealing the contents of the image to the 
server. 
 
3.1. Paillier Encryption 
The Paillier cryptosystem is an additively homomorphic 
public-key encryption scheme, where its security is based on 
the decisional composite residuosity problem [7]. For exam-
ple, given encryption ۤ ۥ  and ۤ ۥ , for all operations per-
formed with plaintext or cyphertext, the following 
corresponding encryption can be obtained where ۤ   ۥ = ۤ ۥ  ۤ ۥ. Similarly, multiplying an encryption ۤ ۥ  with a 
constant   can be calculated as ۤ   ۥ   ۤ ۥ   
 
3.2. Projection in the Encrypted Domain 
A string      corresponding to the expression class is 
assigned to the lower dimensional feature vectors    for              where the server in order to setup the facial 
expression database obtains                 using 
(2). As a requirement for Paillier encryption, all the individ-
ual elements in     and    ranging 1…M are denoted by 
integers. To achieve this, elements in     are scaled by a 
factor   and subsequently quantized to the nearest integer. 
Elements of    are simply quantized to the nearest integer. 
The client (advertiser from earlier example) generates a set 
of private and public keys, the latter of which is sent to the 
server (third-party service provider). ۤ ۥ is obtained and can be sent to the server when the client 
encrypts each pixel value of a consumer’s facial image   
using the earlier generated public key. At this point, the 
encryption ۤ ۥ is obtained using the client’s public key; as 
such neither the server nor anyone else is able to decrypt the 
image hence keeping the identity of the subject (consumer) 
completely private and confidential from everyone. The 
server is able to perform linear operations to determine the 
expression class e.g. operations (9) and (10) on the encrypt-
ed image by leveraging the homomorphic properties of the 
Paillier cryptosystem described above. The resultant expres-
sion class, encrypted by the server using the client’s public-
key is then sent to the client and is decrypted using their 
private-key. 
Formally, facial expression classification in the encrypted 
domain requires the evaluation of equations (9), which will 
be the projection of an encrypted test image and (10), the 
Euclidean distance measure in order to match the image with 
an expression class.  
For projection of an encrypted test image, equation (9) can 
be rewritten as:    ∑        (     ̅)  (11) 
 
where the following elements from (9) are correspondingly 
redefined as:                   ,               and  ̅     ̅   ̅    ̅   . On the side of the server, only the 
encrypted value of a given test image ⟦  ⟧ is known, as such, 
homomorphic properties allow the evaluation of encrypted 
value of    (obtained using clients public key), given by: 
ۤ  ۥ  ∏(⟦  ⟧ ⟦   ̅⟧)          (12) 
From (10), we obtain the   encrypted values of ۤ  ۥ  that 
make up the projection of an encrypted test image ۤ ۥ, in 
order to associate a given test image with an expression class, 
we compute the encrypted distances ۤ  ۥ    1,…,M be-
tween the feature vectors of the test image and the feature 
vectors of the training images. For this, (10) can be rewritten 
as:     ∑(       )                 ∑      ∑(      )   ∑                         
Homomorphic properties allow the encrypted distances to be 
computed as: 
 
 
ۤ  ۥ   ۤ ∑          ۥ ۤ ∑ሺ      ሻ       ۥ ۤ ∑        ۥ          
(13) 
 
where the server can obtain ۤ ∑           ۥ by encrypting the 
value ∑           and ۤ ∑ ሺ      ሻ       ۥ   ∏ ⟦  ⟧ሺ      ሻ    . 
The server participates in a two-party computation protocol 
with the client in order to obtain the value of ۤ ∑         ۥ as 
only ⟦  ⟧ is known to the server. During this exchange, the 
server is also keen to keep the contents of the training 
database     and    private. As such, the server additively 
blinds each feature vector component ⟦  ⟧with a random 
element ⟦  ⟧, to obtain ⟦∑ ⟧  ⟦     ⟧  ⟦  ⟧⟦  ⟧ which 
is sent to the client where it is decrypted to calculate ∑   and 
subsequently ∑ ∑       within the plain domain. Once this is 
done, the client encrypts ⟦∑ ∑      ⟧ and sends it to the server 
who then uses it to deduce ۤ ∑         ۥ, given as: ۤ ∑        ۥ  ۤ ∑∑       ۥ  ∏ቀ⟦  ⟧    ⟦    ⟧ቁ      
In doing so, the server has calculated the encrypted distances 
in (13). The next step in associating a test image with an 
expression class is to identify the image corresponding to the 
lowest encrypted distance. 
3.3. Classification in the Encrypted Domain 
The objective is to establish the lower of two encrypted  -bit 
values ۤ  ۥ  and ⟦  ⟧ . The server calculates ⟦    ⟧  ⟦        ⟧  ⟦  ⟧ۤ  ۥ⟦  ⟧  , where      is a positive 
(    )-bit value. Let the most significant bit of      be 
represented as  ̃   , then  ̃            and  ̃        ቀ     (          )ቁ. Homomorphic properties allow  ̃    to 
be calculated as ⟦ ̃   ⟧  (⟦    ⟧⟦           ⟧)    . The 
server needs to engage the client to calculate ⟦           ⟧ 
as only ⟦    ⟧  is known. As previously done, the server 
generates and applies a random blinding value as ⟦      ⟧  ⟦    ⟧ۤ ۥ which is sent to the client. Once received, the 
blinded value is decrypted and               is reduced. 
The result is encrypted and sent back to the server who 
retrieves it as: ⟦           ⟧  ⟦             ⟧⟦        ⟧  . Again 
using a collaborative two-party calculation protocol, the 
server obtains the encrypted minimum as ⟦ ̃    (     )    ⟧ and the encrypted expression class matching that mini-
mum distance, given by ⟦ ̃    (         )      ⟧. This 
is then returned to the client who decrypts it to find the 
expression class of the test image. 
 
4. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
 
Experiments were performed on the spontaneous database of 
the Natural Visible and Infrared facial Expression NVIE 
database [1], which was developed by using videos to 
stimulate expressions for recognition and emotion inference. 
The developers of the database concede that not all subjects 
displayed the emotions typically used in expression classifi-
cation i.e. anger (AN), disgust (DI), fear (FE), happiness 
(HA), sadness (SA), surprise (SU) and neutral (NE) in some 
cases. As such, only the three expressions that they deemed 
to have been successfully elicited were used in experiments, 
i.e. DI, FE and HA. From the visible database, a subset of 
311 expression images was collected for the 3 classes from 
the apex folder. Using bootstrapping, these were divided into 
ten subsets of 72 images (24 images/class), without allowing 
the same subject to appear multiple times in the same subset. 
The averaged performance results are provided in Section 5. 
Pre-processing included manual eye alignment/cropping and 
each image was converted to greyscale and sized as 90x90. 
A leave-one-out strategy was used for cross validation. 
 
5. PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
 
The performance of the algorithm is measured using the 
experimental setup described in Section 4 and the following 
results were obtained by averaging the (percentage) results 
from the 10 subsets. 
 
Table 1: Confusion matrix of average results (%). 
% DI FE HA 
DI 66.67 29.17 4.17 
FE 29.17 58.33 12.50 
HA 8.33 8.33 83.33 
Av. 69.44 
 
These results obtained using PCA+LDA (FLDA) are shown 
to be better than results obtained using other feature extrac-
tion methods namely PCA, Active Appearance Model 
(AAM), and AAM+LDA [5]. 
 
Table 2: Results of other feature extraction methods (%)[1]. 
% PCA AAM AAM+LDA 
DI FE HA DI FE HA DI FE HA 
DI 50.60 31.33 18.07 65.06 27.71 7.23 59.04 30.12 10.84 
FE 27.42 50.00 22.58 30.65 53.23 16.13 37.10 45.16 17.74 
HA 14.29 14.28 71.43 13.19 6.59 80.22 12.09 12.09 75.82 
Av. 58.47 67.80 61.44 
 
The classification results (%) obtained in the encrypted 
domain ED increases, as value of the scaling factor   is 
increased up to the maximum percentage obtained in the 
plain domain PD as shown in Table 3 below. 
 
Figure 1: Examples of pre-processed facial expression 
images (top row) and encrypted equivalent (bottom row). 
 
 
Table 3: Scaling factor and corresponding classification 
accuracies (%) of a sample dataset. 
ED 
Scaling factor 
                                 
Accuracy (%) 16.67 63.89 68.06 68.06 68.06 
PD (%) 68.06 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
We propose and implement an encrypted domain-based 
automatic spontaneous expression recognition system using 
FLDA. It leverages the homomorphic properties of Paillier 
encryption to allow classification of facial images while 
protecting the identities of the subjects in the images at all 
stages of the classification process. The algorithm is evaluat-
ed using a spontaneous dataset and shows classification can 
be carried out in the encrypted domain without compromis-
ing the classification accuracies obtained in the plain domain. 
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